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Without a Leg to Stand On: The Merger of Article III 
Standing and Merits in Environmental Cases 
Nigel Cooney* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Massachusetts v. EPA,1 the United States Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit wrestled with determining whether petitioners, who 
had brought suit against the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA 
or “the Agency”) in an attempt to force the Agency to regulate carbon 
dioxide under the Clean Air Act,2 had standing to bring the case.3 
Citing a factual overlap between the merits of the case and the 
standing issue, the court ultimately affirmed the EPA’s decision not 
 
 * J.D. Candidate 2007. Notes Editor, Washington University Journal of Law & Policy, 
Vols. 22-24.  
 1. 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2960 (2006). 
 2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (2000). Petitioners brought suit citing § 7521(a)(1) of the 
Act, which states:  
The Administrator shall by regulation prescribe . . . standards applicable to the 
emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicle[s] . . . 
which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be 
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. 
Id. § 7521(a)(1). 
 3. The petitioners in the case were a group of state and city governments, together with a 
number of environmental organizations. Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 53. The group had 
petitioned the EPA, asking that carbon dioxide be regulated as a pollutant within the meaning of 
the Clean Air Act. Id. The EPA Administrator concluded that carbon dioxide was not a 
pollutant, and thus the Agency lacked the authority to regulate the gas. Id. Furthermore, the 
EPA stated that, even if the Agency could regulate carbon dioxide, it would decline to do so. 
Id.; see also 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922 (Sept. 8, 2003) (notice by EPA explaining reasons for denying 
petition). 
 Petitioners sought review of this decision in federal appellate court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7607(b)(1), which states: “A petition for review of action of the Administrator in 
promulgating . . . any standard under . . . § 7521 . . . may be filed only in the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.” 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2000). 
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to regulate carbon dioxide,4 though the process by which the court 
reached this conclusion was anything but clear-cut.  
Massachusetts v. EPA thus raises a number of questions 
concerning the standing doctrine under Article III of the United 
States Constitution. With the Supreme Court having recently granted 
certiorari in the Massachusetts case,5 the Court now has an 
opportunity to clarify many of these issues surrounding Article III 
standing. This Note shall analyze the difficulties associated with the 
approach to standing used by the D.C. Circuit in Massachusetts, and 
discuss a possible resolution to the standing problem in the context of 
global environmental harm litigation. 
Suits that concern or are brought on behalf of the environment 
often involve a confusing interplay between the facts of the given 
case and the science that surrounds those facts.6 In Massachusetts, 
the D.C. Circuit was faced with a factual dispute over global 
warming and the effects of certain greenhouse gases.7 In order to 
establish standing, petitioners had to show that they had a particular 
injury that was caused by global warming, that global warming could 
be attributed to the EPA’s decision not to regulate carbon dioxide, 
and that forcing the EPA to regulate the gas would provide redress 
and alleviate the global warming problem.8 However, the merits of 
 
 4. Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 58. 
 5. 126 S. Ct. 2960 (2006) (order granting certiorari). 
 6. See, e.g., Am. Canoe Ass’n v. Murphy Farms, Inc., 326 F.3d 505, 512 (4th Cir. 2003) 
(“[A] failure to show environmental impact is not dispositive of the question whether there has 
been injury to the plaintiff sufficient to support standing.”); Miss. River Revival, Inc. v. City of 
Minneapolis, 319 F.3d 1013, 1016 (8th Cir. 2003) (discussing the law of environmental suit 
standing as it relates to mootness). 
 7. Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 56–57. The petitioners asserted that a build-up of certain 
gases in the Earth’s atmosphere—carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and 
hydrofluorocarbons (collectively referred to as greenhouse gases)—has led to a rise in global 
temperatures. Final Brief for the Petitioners in Consolidated Cases at 5–6, Massachusetts v. 
EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (No. 03-1361). Furthermore, the petitioners asserted that 
emissions from motor vehicles and power plants in the United States had contributed to global 
warming and the greenhouse effect, causing “a host of harmful effects to the public health and 
welfare of the United States.” Final Brief for the Petitioners in Consolidated Cases, supra, at 6. 
 The Agency responded by citing a report prepared by the National Research Council for 
the National Academy of Sciences, which concluded in part that “a causal linkage” between 
greenhouse gases and global warming could not be “unequivocally established.” Massachusetts, 
415 F.3d at 57 (quoting COMM. ON THE SCI. OF CLIMATE CHANGE, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOME KEY QUESTIONS 17 (2001)). 
 8. See Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 54. The EPA argued in its brief that the petitioners had 
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the case, which involved an inquiry into whether the EPA had the 
discretion to decide that carbon dioxide was not a pollutant (and 
consequently that it should not be regulated), required a factual 
determination of these very same issues. Thus, the D.C. Circuit court 
chose to assume arguendo that the petitioners had standing to bring 
their suit, and ultimately found in favor of the respondent EPA.9 
On its face, this decision, though not favorable to the 
environmentalists in its outcome, may seem at least an attempt by the 
court to hear the petitioners on the merits rather than dismiss the case 
outright for lack of standing. However, as binding precedent in the 
D.C. Circuit, Massachusetts has the potential to vastly enhance the 
burden on environmental groups who seek to challenge EPA actions. 
As this Note shall demonstrate, even where the distinction between 
standing and merits may seem “exceedingly artificial,” a bright line 
division between the two is essential.10 However, the precise notion 
of what establishes a party’s standing in environmental suits is 
ambiguous. Where courts are faced with an overlap between standing 
and merits, alternative methods of assessing a petitioner’s standing 
can and should be used. 
Part II of this Note provides historical background on the 
evolution of the standing doctrine–first discussing the notion of 
standing generally, then looking at environmental suit standing, and 
finally examining the issue of standing as it relates to global 
environmental issue litigation. Part III applies current thinking about 
 
not “adequately demonstrated” two of these standing elements: that the alleged injuries were 
“caused by EPA’s decision not to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases from mobile 
sources”; and that the petitioners’ injuries could be “redressed by a decision in their favor.” Id. 
at 54 (citation omitted). 
 The appellate judges were in sharp disagreement as to whether the petitioners had met this 
burden. Judge Sentelle, in his concurring opinion, concluded that the petitioners had not 
demonstrated sufficient injury to satisfy standing. Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 59 (Sentelle, J., 
concurring). Meanwhile, Judge Tatel, in his dissenting opinion, concluded that at least one 
petitioner had satisfied the standing requirement, namely, the state of Massachusetts. Id. at 64–
65 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (concluding that rising sea levels “would lead to serious loss of and 
damage to Massachusetts’s coastal property”). 
 9. Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 56 (majority opinion). This was the approach laid out in 
the plurality opinion, written by Judge Randolph, though there was no majority that signed on 
to this method. Each of the three judges on the panel wrote their own opinion and resolved the 
standing issue differently. See supra note 8. 
 10. Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 56 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 
U.S. 83, 97 n.2 (1998)). 
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the standing doctrine to the problem of overlap between standing and 
merits in suits that concern global environmental issues, and 
concludes that the current standing doctrine is ill-equipped to address 
such cases. Part IV then proposes a number of solutions to the 
problem of a standing and merits overlap, first looking at solutions 
which may be purely practical and non-judicial, and then looking to 
possible solutions from within the judiciary. Part V concludes with a 
summary of the emerging problem of the overlap between standing 
and merits, and discusses what this problem might mean for the 
future of global environmental cases. 
II. HISTORY 
A. Standing Doctrine Generally 
Since the formation of the United States federal judiciary, courts’ 
power to decide cases and controversies has been limited by Article 
III of the Constitution.11 The factors which distinguish a case or 
controversy as appropriate for judicial review, however, have never 
been explicitly established.12 At a minimum, federal courts are, by 
definition, limited by certain jurisdictional elements that must be set 
forth in each case.13 Among these jurisdictional elements is the idea 
of standing—the plaintiff’s or petitioner’s authority to bring the 
suit.14 Though this basic concept is easy to define, standing “has been 
 
 11. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (limiting federal courts’ jurisdiction to specific classes of 
cases and controversies); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (holding 
that, under Article III, Section 2, the Supreme Court had no authority to issue a writ of 
mandamus to the Secretary of State because original jurisdiction in the case was not conferred 
by the Constitution). 
 12. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1992) (noting that the 
requirement that a plaintiff have standing to sue in court is a function of the separation of 
powers, which “depends largely upon common understanding of what activities are appropriate 
to legislatures, to executives, and to courts”).  
 13. “The requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter ‘springs from 
the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States’ and is ‘inflexible and without 
exception.’” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998) (quoting 
Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Mich. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)) (alteration in 
original). 
 14. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (“[T]he core component of standing is an essential and 
unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol23/iss1/7
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described as one of the more confusing areas of the law,”15 and the 
evolution of the standing doctrine demonstrates as much. 
The early common law required that a litigant have a defined 
“legal interest” in order to show standing.16 This standard has been 
referred to as “restrictive and often circular.”17 Over time, the 
standing requirement evolved into a more workable “injury in fact” 
test.18 The Supreme Court later amended this standard, codifying the 
test into three distinct elements.19 The first element, the “injury in 
fact,” requires that the plaintiff demonstrate an injury which is (1) 
concrete and particularized,20 affecting the plaintiff in a “personal and 
individual way,”21 and (2) actual or imminent, rather than conjectural 
 
 15. William Funk, Standing in the Supreme Court and Circuits: October Term 1997, 51 
ADMIN. L. REV. 343, 352 (1999) (citing KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 
428-29 (3d ed. 1972)); see also Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of 
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (“We need not mince words when we say that 
the concept of ‘Art. III standing’ has not been defined with complete consistency . . . .”). 
 16. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150-52 (1951) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (finding that the federal courts’ power to hear a case is limited to 
those controversies which are “justiciable,” and that the “controversy must be definite and 
concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests”); see also JOSEPH 
VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY: THE COMING OF AGE OF PUBLIC LAW 20–33 (1978) (discussing the 
history of the legal interest theory of standing). 
 17. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for Privilege: The Failure of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L. 
REV. 301, 306 (2002); see also id. at n.10 (“A litigant ordinarily has standing to challenge 
governmental action of the sort that, if taken by a private person, would create a right of action 
cognizable by the courts.” (quoting McGrath, 341 U.S. at 151–52 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
 18. See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-53 (1970) 
(holding that the petitioners had established injury in fact and rejecting the lower court’s 
requirement that the petitioners demonstrate a legal interest). 
 19. See, e.g., Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976) (holding that 
the standing requirement of Article III mandates that, in addition to demonstrating injury, the 
plaintiff must show that the court has the power to provide redress); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 
490, 498 (1975) (similarly holding); see also Nichol, supra note 17, at 307-08 for a discussion 
of the evolution of the injury in fact requirement for standing. 
 20. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Justice Scalia 
foreshadowed his requirement in Lujan for injury to be “particularized and concrete” while 
sitting as a circuit court judge in Center for Auto Safety v. National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, 793 F.2d 1322, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
 At least one commentator has noted the paradox associated with requiring a plaintiff to 
show particularized, concrete injury in cases in which courts resort to abstract, formalist 
reasoning to decide issues while ignoring the concrete injury that plaintiffs were required to 
demonstrate. See David M. Driesen, Standing for Nothing: The Paradox of Demanding 
Concrete Context for Formalist Adjudication, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 808, 811 (2004) (citing the 
decision in Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998), as such an example).  
 21. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1. 
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or hypothetical.22 Second, the plaintiff must establish a “causal 
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of.”23 
Finally, the injury must be one which is likely to be redressed by a 
favorable outcome.24 
Unfortunately for litigants, the application of this standing test has 
turned out to be “radically unsatisfying” in its consistency.25 Some 
cases have used a very high standard to establish standing,26 making 
for a “powerful barrier to federal court review.”27 At the same time, 
others have had a much more relaxed threshold for standing,28 
likening the requirement to that of notice pleading, and requiring that 
standing merely “be something more than an ingenious academic 
exercise in the conceivable.”29 Such contradictions have led some 
commentators to call for sweeping revisions to the standing 
doctrine.30 
 
 22. Id. at 560 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)); see also 
Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155 (“[The] injury . . . must be concrete in both a qualitative and 
temporal sense. The complainant must allege an injury to himself that is distinct and palpable.” 
(citations omitted)); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). 
 23. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (citing Simon, 426 U.S. at 41–42). 
 24. Id. at 561. 
 25. Nichol, supra note 17, at 304. 
 26. See, e.g., FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990) (“[S]tanding 
cannot be ‘inferred argumentatively from averments in the pleadings,’ but rather ‘must 
affirmatively appear in the record.’” (citations omitted)); Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. 
Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 544-49 (1986) (holding that a school board member who was sued in his 
official capacity had no standing to appeal as an individual parent when the board itself 
declined to appeal); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504 (1975) (“Petitioners must allege facts 
from which it reasonably could be inferred that, absent the respondents’ [conduct], there is a 
substantial probability that they would have been able to purchase or lease in Penfield and that, 
if the court affords the relief requested, the asserted inability of petitioners will be removed.”). 
 27. Nichol, supra note 17, at 309 (quoting ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 71 (1997)). 
 28. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 
183–88 (2000) (holding that environmental groups had standing to seek an injunction against a 
polluter for violation of the Clean Water Act, even though penalties would be paid to the 
government and specific injury to the environment was questionable); Holly Sugar Corp. v. 
Goshen County Coop. Beet Growers Ass’n, 725 F.2d 564, 568 (10th Cir. 1984) (“When 
deciding the issue of standing, a court must accept as true all of the material allegations of the 
complaint and must view the complaint in the manner most favorable to the complaining 
party.”). 
 29. 13A CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 3531.15 (2d ed. 1984) (quoting United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency 
Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973)). 
 30. See, e.g., Nichol, supra note 17; David M. Roberts, Fact Pleading, Notice Pleading, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol23/iss1/7
p175 Cooney book pages.doc  4/12/2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2007]  Article III Standing in Environmental Cases 181 
 
 
These three elements—injury in fact, causation, and 
redressability—are undeniably the plaintiff’s burden to establish,31 
though it is often unclear how much a plaintiff must show to meet 
this burden. A lax standing requirement may lead to a rushed and ill-
considered decision, while a heightened requirement can probe 
excessively into the merits of a case prior to trial.32 As an added 
confusion, the legal standard for a plaintiff’s standing may shift 
according to the posture of a particular case. At the pleading stage, 
courts have historically found broad, general allegations to be 
sufficient to establish standing.33 However, under different 
circumstances, where an opposing party has filed a summary 
judgment motion based on the plaintiff’s lack of standing, “the 
plaintiff can no longer rest on ‘mere allegations,’ but must ‘set forth’ 
by affidavit or other evidence ‘specific facts,’” consistent with the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to prove standing.34 Lastly, “at the 
final stage, those facts (if controverted) must be supported adequately 
by the evidence adduced at trial.”35 This confusing rule of law seems 
to indicate that a defendant can manipulate the plaintiff’s burden to 
show standing merely by choosing the best tactical stage at which to 
attack the opposing party’s standing.36 Commentators have thus 
noted that the summary judgment procedure is generally 
 
and Standing, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 390 (1980); Joshua Schwartz, Note, Limiting Steel Co.: 
Recapturing a Broader “Arising Under” Jurisdictional Question, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2255 
(2004). 
 31. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); Warth, 422 U.S. at 508. 
 32. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 29, § 3531.15. 
 33. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (“At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury 
resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we ‘presum[e] 
that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.’” 
(quoting Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990) (alteration in original)). 
 34. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)) (citations omitted). “When a 
motion for summary judgment is made . . . the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue for trial.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 55 (D.C. 
Cir. 2005) (“[A] petitioner challenging agency action has the same burden of production as a 
plaintiff moving for summary judgment in the district court: it must support each element of its 
claim to standing by affidavit or other evidence.” (citations omitted)).  
 35. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (citations omitted). 
 36. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 29, § 3531.15. 
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“inappropriate as a means for deciding jurisdictional issues,” and thus 
should not be used to address arguments concerning standing.37 
B. Standing in the Environmental Context 
In the context of environmental suits (particularly those brought 
by private citizen groups) the issue of standing has proved especially 
contentious.38 The nature of the harm involved and the type of redress 
often sought in environmental litigation has left some commentators 
concluding that it is “difficult and probably fruitless” to apply the 
strict rules of standing in environmental cases.39 On the other hand, 
insofar as the standing doctrine implicates issues regarding 
federalism,40 other commentators have expressed concern that the use 
of litigation to achieve environmental policy goals has produced 
“results that are mixed, or at least controversial.”41  
Early environmental law decisions reflected a willingness on the 
part of courts to apply a loose interpretation of the standing 
doctrine.42 In decisions such as Sierra Club v. Morton43 and 
 
 37. Id. 
 38. See Kristi M. Smith, Who’s Suing Whom?: A Comparison of Government and Citizen 
Suit Environmental Enforcement Actions Brought Under EPA-Administered Statutes, 1995-
2000, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 359, 371–74 (2004). Congressional authorization of 
environmental citizen suits has met with mixed criticism. Proponents have argued that citizen 
suits hold government agencies accountable for performing their required duties. Id. at 372. 
Critics have countered by saying that citizen suits undermine government enforcement, and 
often end in settlements that benefit environmental interest groups at the public’s expense. Id. at 
373–74.  
 39. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 29, § 3531.15. 
 40. See Michael S. Greve, Friends of the Earth, Foes of Federalism, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. 
& POL’Y F. 167, 168 (2001) (“[S]tanding and federalism are in fact quite closely connected.”). 
 41. Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 
293, 294 (2005). Even Justice Scalia has seemingly expressed contradictory views on the 
propriety of environmental suits, noting with disdain “the judiciary’s long love affair with 
environmental litigation.” Steve France, “What’s It to You?”: Scalia’s ‘Rude Question’ May 
Help to Clear the Air in His Campaign to Curb Citizen Environmental Suits, 85 A.B.A. J., Oct. 
1999, at 36, 36 (quoting Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of 
the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 884 (1983)). He later commented that the 
environment is “a matter in which it is common to think all persons have an interest.” Bennett 
v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 165 (1997). 
 42. See Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 
F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (courts may require government agencies to comply with the 
National Environmental Protection Act); Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1097 
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (noting that a private citizens group with a “demonstrated interest in protecting 
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Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp,44 the 
Court allowed plaintiffs to allege injury in broad, general terms, not 
specifically limited to economic injury. Plaintiffs claiming an 
infringement of natural, aesthetic interests were deemed by the Court 
to have met their burdens to show injury in fact.45 This rule of law 
was subsequently adopted and applied by the lower courts.46 
The trend toward liberalization of the standing doctrine was 
reversed, however, beginning with the two Lujan decisions, Lujan v. 
National Wildlife Federation47 (Lujan I) and Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife48 (Lujan II). In Lujan I, an environmental citizens’ group 
challenged the Secretary of the Interior’s reclassification of certain 
public lands, claiming that the reclassification was an ill-considered 
decision that would lead to mining, thereby harming the 
environment.49 Though members of the citizen group had filed 
 
the environment from pesticide pollution” had a “necessary stake” in the controversy to 
challenge the Secretary of Agriculture’s failure to regulate use of one type of pesticide). 
 In an article he wrote while serving as a circuit court judge, Justice Scalia noted that the 
Calvert Cliffs decision “began the judiciary’s long love affair with environmental litigation.” 
Scalia, supra note 41, at 884. 
 43. 405 U.S. 727 (1972). A citizens group, challenging construction of a ski resort near 
Sequoia National Park, claimed the development “would destroy or otherwise adversely affect 
the scenery, natural and historic objects and wildlife of the park and would impair the 
enjoyment of the park for future generations.” Id. at 734 (citation omitted). Though the Court 
found that such aesthetic concerns and harm to environmental well-being could support a claim 
for injury in fact, the Court ultimately dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims because the plaintiffs 
themselves were not “among the injured.” Id. at 735. 
 44. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). The Court noted that the injury in fact burden could be met 
through proof of non-economic injuries, and a plaintiff may sue under a statute if the case falls 
within the “zone of interests” of the statute. Id. at 153. 
 45. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 
412 U.S. 669 (1973). The Court affirmed the plaintiff’s standing claim of “economic, 
recreational and aesthetic harm” as a result of the defendant’s conduct. Id. at 678. The Court 
noted that SCRAP members filed affidavits saying they “use[d] the forests, rivers, streams, 
mountains, and other natural resources . . . for camping, hiking, fishing, sightseeing, and other 
recreational and aesthetic purposes.” Id. at 678 (citation omitted). 
 46. See Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 
1965); Crowther v. Seaborg, 312 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Colo. 1970). 
 47. 497 U.S. 871 (1990). 
 48. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
 49. Lujan I, 497 U.S. at 879. The petitioners argued, among other things, that the 
Secretary of the Interior, in reclassifying the lands, had violated the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1785 (2000), by “failing to consider multiple uses for the 
disputed lands, focusing inordinately on such uses as mineral exploitation and development; 
and failing to provide public notice of decisions.” Lujan I, 497 U.S. at 879 (citations omitted). 
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affidavits claiming personal injury due to the reclassification,50 and 
those affidavits were held by the circuit court to be sufficient to 
survive a motion to dismiss,51 a majority of the Supreme Court 
ultimately found the affidavits insufficient to withstand the opposing 
party’s summary judgment motion, as injury had not been adequately 
alleged.52 Justice Blackmun, in dissent, criticized the majority’s 
holding, saying the question was “not whether [the plaintiff group] 
ha[d] proved that it ha[d] standing to bring this action, but simply 
whether the materials before the District Court established that there 
[was] a genuine issue for trial.”53 
Two years later, a similar approach on the part of the Court 
resulted in a narrowing of environmental suit standing in Lujan II. 
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that the petitioners, who 
were challenging the Secretary of the Interior’s interpretation of a 
 
 50. Lujan I, 497 U.S. at 886. The Court reprinted one such affidavit, alleging purely 
aesthetic injury:  
My recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment of federal lands, particularly those in the 
vicinity of South Pass-Green Mountain, Wyoming have been and continue to be 
adversely affected in fact by the unlawful actions of the Bureau and the Department. In 
particular, the South Pass-Green Mountain area of Wyoming has been opened to the 
staking of mining claims and oil and gas leasing, an action which threatens the 
aesthetic beauty and wildlife habitat potential of these lands.  
Id. 
 51. Id. at 880. 
 52. Id. at 889. The Supreme Court, like the district court, noted that the affidavits 
contained “only a bare allegation of injury,” and that statements showing a petitioner uses 
“unspecified portions of an immense tract of territory, on some portions of which mining 
activity has occurred or probably will occur” were insufficient. Id. at 887, 889. 
 One commentator, analyzing the implications of the Lujan I decision, noted that the 
opinion signaled a growing hostility on the part of the Court toward environmental litigation: 
“Environmental groups now must show injury in fact with greater specificity than the federal 
courts previously required. Current judicial restraint has altered the focus of standing 
requirements, has led to uncertainty, and has posed new challenges for future environmental 
litigants.” Sarah A. Robichaud, Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation: The Supreme Court 
Tightens the Reins on Standing for Environmental Groups, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 443, 444 
(1991) (citations omitted). 
 The narrow, focused approach to an individual group’s standing used by the Court in Lujan 
I arguably has the effect of thwarting environmentalists’ attempts to achieve “across-the-board 
protection of our Nation’s wildlife.” Id. at 471 (quoting Lujan I, 497 U.S. at 894). 
 53. Lujan I, 497 U.S. at 903 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Additionally, 
Blackmun noted that the majority “fail[ed] to recognize . . . the principle that procedural rules 
should be construed pragmatically, so as to ensure the just and efficient resolution of legal 
disputes.” Id. at 912. 
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provision of the Endangered Species Act,54 had not shown adequate 
injury.55 The petitioners claimed injury in fact through an inability to 
observe, at some future point in time, certain species of endangered 
animals in their natural habitat.56 The majority emphasized a stringent 
requirement for injury in order to establish standing, and noted that 
“[w]here there is no actual harm . . . its imminence (though not its 
precise extent) must be established.”57 
In an effort to side-step what was becoming an increasingly 
convoluted and confusing area of law, a number of circuit courts 
began to forgo standing analysis by using an approach known as 
“hypothetical jurisdiction.”58 Under this approach, a court could 
 
 54. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2000). Petitioners brought suit claiming that the Secretary 
of the Interior had failed to comply with § 1533 and § 1536 of the Endangered Species Act, by 
refusing to require other government agencies to confer with the Secretary to ensure that other 
agencies’ actions would not endanger threatened species in foreign territories. Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife (Lujan II), 504 U.S. 555, 558 (1992). 
 55. Lujan II, 504 U.S. at 562. Quoting the petitioners’ complaint, Justice Scalia wrote that 
the “claim to injury is that the lack of consultation [with the respective agencies] increase[s] the 
rate of extinction of endangered and threatened species.” Id. (citations omitted). 
 56. Id. at 564. The majority found it significant that the petitioners claimed only to return 
to the affected area at some point in the future, and did not say specifically when they would be 
returning. Id. 
 57. Id. at 565 n.2. The majority paid special attention to the requirement that the alleged 
harm be imminent, and took issue with the dissent’s claim that “a reasonable finder of fact could 
conclude . . . that [the affiants] will soon return to the project sites.” Id. at 591 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting). In particular, the majority criticized the dissent’s use of the word “soon” which 
“stretch[ed] beyond the breaking point” and was incompatible with standing doctrine which 
required that injury be “certainly impending.” Lujan II, 504 U.S. at 565 n.2 (majority opinion) 
(quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)). In his dissent, Justice Blackmun 
concluded that the majority’s opinion represented a “slash-and-burn expedition through the law 
of environmental standing.” Id. at 606 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 For discussions of the potential impact of the Lujan II decision, see Lisa M. Bromberg, 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Where Does the Standing Issue Stand in Environmental 
Litigation?, 16 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 761 (1993); Tony Ed Monzingo, I Think That I Shall 
Never See, Standing for a Tree: Or Has the Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife Decision Spelled 
Doom for Extraterritorial Environmental Standing?, 10 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 431 (1993).  
 58. The hypothetical jurisdiction approach was labeled as such in United States v. 
Troescher, 99 F.3d 933, 934 n.1 (9th Cir. 1996). The Ninth Circuit noted that in that case “the 
complex problem of jurisdiction presents the sole substantial disagreement” between the 
parties, and thus the court chose to assume without deciding the existence of subject matter 
jurisdiction, where the “difficulty of resolving [the jurisdictional question] is far greater than the 
difficulty of resolving [the merits . . . ].” Id. (alterations in original).  
 For similar instances where hypothetical jurisdiction was used by the circuit courts, see 
Smith v. Avino, 91 F.3d 105, 108 (11th Cir. 1996) (“[I]t is permissible for the Court to bypass 
jurisdictional questions and decide the case on the merits when the jurisdictional issue is 
difficult [and] the law is not well-established . . . .”). See also Clow v. U.S. Dept. of Housing & 
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hypothetically assume for the purposes of argument that a plaintiff 
had standing to bring suit. As long as the court ultimately ruled 
against the plaintiff on the merits, the standing issue could be held 
irrelevant and not worth considering.59 While this practice may have 
drastically eased the burden on courts to wade through difficult issues 
of injury in fact, causation, and redressability, it was a practice that 
was abruptly put to an end with the Supreme Court’s decision in Steel 
Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment.60 
In Steel Co., a citizen group brought suit against a manufacturing 
company for failing to file toxic and hazardous storage reports within 
a required time period, in violation of the Emergency Planning and 
Community Right to Know Act.61 Because the defendant company 
had filed the necessary reports by the time the suit was filed, the 
district court held that the citizen group lacked standing to maintain 
the suit.62 When the Seventh Circuit reversed this holding,63 the 
defendants appealed. In reversing the circuit court decision, the 
 
Urban Dev., 948 F.2d 614, 616 & 616 n.2 (9th Cir. 1991) (invoking the hypothetical 
jurisdiction approach, and criticizing the dissenting opinion for objecting to its use); Cross-
Sound Ferry Servs., Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 934 F.2d 327, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1991) 
(use of hypothetical jurisdiction in the environmental context); United States v. Parcel of Land, 
928 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1991) (noting that hypothetical jurisdiction allowed the appellate court to 
avoid “hack[ing] [its] way through [a] jurisdictional bramble bush”); Browning-Ferris Indus. v. 
Muszynski, 889 F.2d 151, 154–55 (2d Cir. 1990) (again using hypothetical jurisdiction in the 
environmental context). 
 59. According to the Ninth Circuit in SEC v. American Capital Investments, Inc., 98 F.3d 
1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 1996), use of hypothetical jurisdiction requires four elements: “(1) the 
jurisdictional question must be difficult; (2) the decision on the merits must be clear; (3) the 
appeal must be resolved against the party asserting jurisdiction; and (4) undertaking a resolution 
on the merits . . . must not affect the outcome.” Id. (citation omitted). 
 60. 523 U.S. 83 (1998). The Court declined to endorse the hypothetical jurisdiction 
approach and commented, “This conclusion should come as no surprise, since it is reflected in a 
long and venerable line of our cases.” Id. at 94. This statement itself might have come as 
somewhat of a surprise, considering a number of the cases employing hypothetical jurisdiction 
cited Supreme Court authority endorsing its use. 
 61. Id. at 83. The Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 11001–11050 (2000), provides, in relevant part, “[A]ny person may commence a civil action 
on his own behalf against . . . [a]n owner or operator of a facility for failure . . . to [c]omplete 
and submit an inventory form under section 11022(a) of this title.” Id. § 11046(a)(1)(A)(iii). 
 62. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 88. 
 63. Id.; see also Citizens for a Better Env’t v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1242 (7th Cir. 
1996) (holding that the plaintiffs had standing to maintain their suit, and relying on Supreme 
Court precedent set in Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 
U.S. 49 (1987)). 
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Supreme Court saw an opportunity to reaffirm and strengthen the 
standing doctrine.64 The majority insisted on a bright line rule that 
issues regarding standing be reviewed prior to any discussion of the 
merits.65 As a jurisdictional issue, constitutional standing was held by 
the Court to be an essential element that must be resolved at the 
outset of a case. The hypothetical jurisdiction approach “carrie[d] the 
courts beyond the bounds of authorized judicial action and thus 
offend[ed] fundamental principles of separation of powers.”66 
Moreover, hypothetical jurisdiction, the Court noted, “produces 
nothing more than a hypothetical judgment.”67 
Writing the majority opinion in Steel Co., Justice Scalia 
acknowledged in a footnote the potential problem of a standing and 
merits overlap that might blur the bright line mandate to resolve 
standing first.68 However, Scalia insisted that this potential problem 
would only arise in the context of determining statutory, as opposed 
to constitutional, standing.69 While Scalia noted that it might be 
“exceedingly artificial to draw a distinction” between statutory 
standing and a merits inquiry, he went on to say that “[t]he same 
cannot be said of the Article III requirement of remediable injury in 
fact, which (except with regard to entirely frivolous claims) has 
nothing to do with the text of the statute relied upon.”70 
 
 64. The Court noted that its “insistence that proper jurisdiction appear begins at least as 
early as 1804,” and has been restated consistently “in the clearest fashion.” Steel Co., 523 U.S. 
at 95. The Court added, “[T]wo centuries of jurisprudence affirm[] the necessity of determining 
jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits.” Id. at 98.  
 In reaffirming this characterization of the standing doctrine, the majority also took issue 
with Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion, which pointed out (as have a number of scholars), 
that the redressability prong of standing “is a judicial creation of the past 25 years.” Id. at 103 
n.5 (quoting id. at 124 (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
 65. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 101–02 (majority opinion) (“For a court to pronounce upon the 
meaning or the constitutionality of a . . . law when it has no jurisdiction to do so is, by very 
definition, for a court to act ultra vires.”). 
 66. Id. at 94. 
 67. Id. at 101. 
 68. Id. at 97 n.2. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. It was this footnote in particular that the D.C. Circuit relied upon in Massachusetts 
v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 56 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The D.C. court noted the “highly unusual 
circumstance,” in which the Article III standing issue was, contrary to the language in Steel Co., 
no longer distinct from the merits of the case. Id. 
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Commentators were quick to weigh in on the implications and the 
prudence of the Steel Co. decision. While some heralded the decision 
as a strict enforcement of a rule mandated by federalism and the text 
of the Constitution,71 others were less enthusiastic, noting that the 
rule in Steel Co. led to confusing and inconsistent approaches to 
standing among the lower courts.72 Some standing issues previously 
left open were suddenly resolved to the detriment of citizen 
plaintiffs,73 while the narrow exceptions carved out in Steel Co. were 
tortuously manipulated to achieve specific results in other cases.74 
Some commentators concluded that the jurisdictional rule in Steel Co. 
was largely motivated by political concerns, and ultimately wholly 
unnecessary.75 The strict requirements set out for standing are, 
 
 71. See, e.g., Scott C. Idleman, The Emergence of Jurisdictional Resequencing in the 
Federal Courts, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6 (2001) (“The Court’s repudiation of the practice was 
correct for several reasons . . . .”); Joan Steinman, After Steel Co.: “Hypothetical Jurisdiction” 
in the Federal Appellate Courts, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 855, 939 (2001) (“The conclusion 
that Steel Co. should be read to preclude exercises of hypothetical jurisdiction in which a court 
of appeals assumes arguendo that the case before it satisfies Article III requirements is 
inescapable.”). 
 72. “Courts and parties would also save substantial time disposing of easy cases early, 
rather than bouncing them through the jurisdictional system developing standing doctrine. If . . . 
courts lack the power to decide any other issues when standing is in doubt, then policy reasons 
for reaching the merits are irrelevant.” Schwartz, supra note 30, at 2259; see also Funk, supra 
note 15, at 347 (“Steel Co. . . . reflect[s] the Court’s seemingly unrelenting hostility to citizen 
suits as an adjunct or supplement to government environmental enforcement . . . .”). 
 73. See Comment, Assuming Jurisdiction Arguendo: The Rationale and Limits of 
Hypothetical Jurisdiction, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 712, 746 (1979) (arguing against hypothetical 
jurisdiction, and noting that, where the standing issue is purportedly reserved, it has in fact been 
decided in the affirmative, since “deciding the issue on the merits necessarily implies a decision 
that no [standing problem] exists”). 
 74. See, e.g., 21st Century Telesis Joint Venture v. FCC, 318 F.3d 192, 203 (D.C. Cir. 
2003) (Williams, J., dissenting) (making use of an exception to Steel Co. and noting that, where 
the merits issue has been previously resolved “in a companion case,” the standing issue need 
not be addressed); Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 230 F.3d 1141, 1147 (9th Cir. 
2000) (concluding that the statutory standing and merits issues had merged, and the 
constitutional standing issue could be resolved through factual inquiry); Am. Petroleum Inst. v. 
EPA, 216 F.3d 50, 63–66 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (making a heavy factual inquiry into the standing 
issue to resolve standing prior to reviewing the facts to determine the merits); Friends of the 
Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 179 F.3d 107, 115–16 (4th Cir. 1999) (involving 
a lengthy analysis of the three standing requirements and ultimately concluding that the 
plaintiffs lacked standing). 
 75. See Maxwell L. Stearns, From Lujan to Laidlaw: A Preliminary Model of 
Environmental Standing, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 321, 322–23 (2001). 
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according to some, not mandated by the framers, and a quasi-
jurisdictional approach to standing issues may in fact be preferable.76 
Given the almost decade-long trend of narrowing the 
environmental standing doctrine from Lujan I to Steel Co., the 
Court’s 2000 decision in Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw 
Environmental Services, Inc.77 was, to say the least, unexpected. The 
decision in Laidlaw broke with a line of more restrictive 
environmental standing decisions78 by holding that a citizen group 
had standing to bring a suit seeking civil penalties against a 
corporation discharging pollutants in violation of EPA regulations 
under the Clean Water Act,79 even though the monetary penalties 
sought would be paid to the United States Treasury and not to the 
petitioners themselves,80 and the district court found that the 
petitioners had failed to show any actual harm to the environment.81  
Justice Ginsberg, writing for the majority in Laidlaw, found that 
the petitioners had adequately demonstrated injury in fact through 
their affidavits, which showed that Laidlaw’s toxic waste discharges, 
together with the affiants’ concerns about those discharges, directly 
affected those affiants’ recreational, aesthetic, and economic 
interests.82 That the lower court ultimately found no actual harm to 
the environment was irrelevant, according to the majority, because 
“the relevant showing for purposes of Article III standing . . . is not 
 
 76. See generally Schwartz, supra note 30, at 2255–60. 
 77. 528 U.S. 167 (2000). 
 78. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) (discussed supra notes 
14–16 and accompanying text); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (Lujan II), 504 U.S. 555 (1992) 
(discussed supra notes 54–60 and accompanying text). 
 79. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2000). Laidlaw had been issued a National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System permit under § 1342 of the Act. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 174–76. 
Friends of the Earth brought suit against Laidlaw in an effort to force the company to comply 
with its permit, under § 1365(a), which provides for private citizen suits brought by “a person 
or persons having an interest which is or may be adversely affected.” Id. at 173 (citing 33 
U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2000); quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (2000)). 
 80. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 175 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)). 
 81. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 956 F. Supp. 588, 600 (D.S.C. 
1997) (finding “no adverse effect on the indigenous biological community in the North Tyger 
River downstream from Laidlaw’s facility. . . . [And thus] no showing of any significant harm 
to the environment . . . .”), vacated and remanded by 149 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 1998), rev’d and 
remanded, 528 U.S. 167 (2000). 
 82. Id. at 183–84. 
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injury to the environment but injury to the plaintiff.”83 Likewise, the 
Court found the civil penalties at issue in the case to be an adequate 
form of redress, because the penalties acted as a sufficient deterrent 
to keep Laidlaw from making unlawful discharges in the future.84 
Justice Scalia dissented “from all of this,”85 and criticized the 
majority in Laidlaw for allowing mere “concerns” about the 
environment to fulfill the injury requirement for standing.86 Absent 
any actual environmental harm, Scalia noted that the “vague, 
contradictory, and unsubstantiated allegations of ‘concern’” accepted 
by the majority as proof of standing turned the injury in fact 
requirement into a “sham.”87 
Not surprisingly, scholars have had much to say about the 
majority opinion in Laidlaw.88 Some have considered the decision a 
 
 83. Id. at 181. 
 84. Id. at 187. The Court noted that “all civil penalties have some deterrent effect.” Id. at 
185 (quoting Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 102 (1997)). Additionally, the Court 
recognized: 
[T]here may be a point at which the deterrent effect of a claim for civil penalties 
becomes so insubstantial or so remote that it cannot support citizen standing. The fact 
that this vanishing point is not easy to ascertain does not detract from the deterrent 
power of such penalties in the ordinary case.  
Id. at 186. 
 85. Id. at 198 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 86. Id. at 199. To the majority’s claim that the “relevant showing . . . is not injury to the 
environment but injury to the plaintiff,” id. at 181 (majority opinion), Scalia responded: 
This statement is correct, as far as it goes. We have certainly held that a demonstration 
of harm to the environment is not enough to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement . . . . 
[H]owever, a lack of demonstrable harm to the environment will translate, as it plainly 
does here, into a lack of demonstrable harm to citizen plaintiffs.  
Id. at 199 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 87. Id. at 201. 
 88. See Stephen Lanza, Note, The Liberalization of Article III Standing: The Supreme 
Court’s Ill-Considered Endorsement of Citizen Suits in Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw 
Environmental Services, Inc., 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1447, 1450 (2000) (arguing that the Laidlaw 
decision, by granting private plaintiffs the right to sue in the absence of actual harm to the 
environment, “will foster increased citizen interference with government enforcement, thereby 
placing public policy in the hands of private citizens instead of in the hands of responsible 
public officials.”); see also Greve, supra note 40, at 169 (criticizing the Court’s “liberal wing” 
majority opinion, and noting “in contrast to the lofty pronouncements on ‘civic participation’ 
and ‘environmental values’ that characterized the standing decisions of the environmental era 
some three decades ago, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion is laconic, even pedantic, and makes no 
mention of principles or public purposes.” (citations omitted)). But see France, supra note 41, at 
36. Writing prior to the decision in Laidlaw, France speaks of the importance of the decision, 
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blow to federalism: “In permitting Congress to define the boundaries 
of Article III standing, the Laidlaw Court sanctions an interest group 
bargain, rather than a public purpose.”89  
C. Standing in Litigation of Global Environmental Issues 
The feud over environmental suit standing becomes that much 
more contentious when plaintiffs seek to litigate a global wrong, as 
opposed to one which is localized. Though the Supreme Court has yet 
to weigh in on the debate, various courts have offered interesting 
insight into how such problems might be resolved. 
One early case dealing with litigation of global environmental 
harm was City of Los Angeles v. National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA).90 In this case, petitioners sued to compel 
the NHTSA to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) in 
conjunction with its Corporate Average Federal Economy (CAFE) 
standards.91 The D.C. Circuit found that the petitioners had standing, 
 
and notes “[a] High Court loss would decimate citizen enforcement of environmental statutes. 
. . . Defendants could drag out litigation, confident that last-minute compliance would spare 
them any risk of penalties and attorney fees.” Id. (quotation omitted); see also Stearns, supra 
note 75, at 327 (“As much as Lujan has been vilified, Laidlaw appears poised to be commended 
as a restoration of sound principles of standing.”). 
 89. Greve, supra note 40, at 172; see also Edgar B. Washburn & Christopher J. Carr, 
Courts Go Too Far in Allowing Environmental Citizen Suits, ANDREWS HAZARDOUS WASTE 
LITIG. REP., Aug. 31, 2001, at 16. In criticizing the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Ecological 
Rights Foundation v. Pacific Lumber Co., 230 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2000), the authors noted: 
“[by] reject[ing] any requirement that a plaintiff have regular or continuous contact with the 
area or resource allegedly impacted by the defendant’s conduct[,] . . . the court extended 
Laidlaw so far that standing will almost never be an impediment to environmental citizen suits 
in the Ninth Circuit.” Washburn & Carr, supra, at 16. 
 90. 912 F.2d 478 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per curiam), overruled in part by Fla. Audubon Soc’y 
v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
 91. The petitioners challenged the NHTSA’s standards for fuel economy in cars for model 
years 1987, 1988, and 1989. City of Los Angeles, 912 F.2d at 482. They argued that the setting 
of the standards was, itself, the “federal action” which triggered the need for an EIS. Id. at 482–
83. The petitioners sought to enforce section 102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA), which requires that environmental impact be taken into consideration as part of 
any “major Federal action[] significantly affecting the quality of the human environment . . . .” 
National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2000). The petitioners claimed 
that this language required that the NHTSA include global warming when considering 
environmental impact. City of Los Angeles, 912 F.2d at 482. The remedy sought by the 
petitioners was thus a procedural one, because NEPA does not allow parties to sue in order to 
compel a certain outcome or determination based on the EIS. See Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood 
Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980) (per curiam) (noting NEPA does not mandate 
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based on their concerns that the new emission standards would 
contribute to global warming.92 While the lax approach to standing 
used by the majority was later overruled by a subsequent D.C. Circuit 
case,93 the holding in City of Los Angeles demonstrated that at least 
one court was willing to embrace an argument that global warming 
could form the basis for legal injury. Significantly, the majority noted 
that “no one . . . appears to dispute the serious and imminent threat to 
our environment posed by a continuation of global warming[,]”94 and 
further noted that “[n]o one disputes the causal link between carbon 
dioxide and global warming.”95 
Though some judges might agree with such a statement, it is clear 
that not all federal judges believe that the problem of global warming 
ought to be litigated in federal courts. In Connecticut v. American 
Electric Power,96 a group of state attorneys general97 acting parens 
patriae98 attempted to sue a collection of power plants on the East 
 
particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary process).  
 92. City of Los Angeles, 912 F.2d at 482. Under a conventional standing analysis, the link 
between petitioners and the injury in fact seemed highly attenuated: petitioners claimed that the 
failure to prepare an EIS created the risk that fossil fuel combustion would increase, thereby 
creating the risk of increased global warming, thereby creating a risk of a rise in sea levels 
which would damage shorelines and agriculture, thereby harming petitioners. Id. at 483–84 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part). 
 However, the majority ultimately found standing because, under the petitioners’ procedural 
cause of action, the court determined that the petitioners only needed to show that the alleged 
injury be “fairly traceable” to the proposed action. Id. at 495 (Wald, C.J., dissenting in part) 
(citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978)). 
 93. The rule of law in City of Los Angeles was overruled by Florida Audubon Society v. 
Bentsen, which, following the rule in Lujan, required plaintiffs in NEPA cases to show a 
“distinct risk to a particularized interest of the plaintiff.” 94 F.3d 658, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(citing Lujan II, 504 U.S. 555, 572–73 (1992)). 
 94. City of Los Angeles, 912 F.2d at 493-94. 
 95. Id. at 495. 
 96. 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 97. State attorneys general from the states of Connecticut, New York, California, Iowa, 
New Jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin, along with New York City and a number 
of citizen groups, joined together as plaintiffs in the cause of action. Id. at 267. 
 98. “Parent of his or her country. The state regarded as a sovereign.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1144 (8th ed. 2004). The term “is a judicial construct that does not lend itself to a 
simple or exact definition,” but has been described as referring to the state’s assertion of “quasi-
sovereign” interests. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex. rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 
601 (1982). Though it is not entirely clear what standing requirements exist in such instances, 
“[a] quasi-sovereign interest must be sufficiently concrete to create an actual controversy 
between the State and the defendant,” and must “survive the standing requirements of Art[icle] 
III.” Id. at 602.  
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Coast in a common law tort-based nuisance action for contributing to 
global warming.99 Although some commentators have 
enthusiastically endorsed this approach and indicated that such claims 
could be theoretically likened to the cigarette and tobacco mass-tort 
class actions,100 others have been reluctant to subscribe to such a 
theory.101 Ultimately, the district court judge in American Electric 
Power dismissed the plaintiffs’ case because the theory of injury 
rested on a political question102 that required an “initial policy 
determination” which was properly the province of state and national 
legislative bodies.103 
The holding in American Electric Power demonstrates the 
principal problem with litigation of global environmental harm: the 
uncertainty surrounding the science behind the problem, together 
with the lack of clear government policy or legislation, serves to 
undermine any party’s standing to claim injury and seek redress. In 
 
 99. The plaintiffs named the American Electric Power Company, Southern Company, 
Tennessee Valley Authority, Xcel Energy Inc., and Cinergy Corporation as defendants, 
claiming that they were the “five largest emitters of carbon dioxide in the United States,” and 
that their emissions “constitute[d] approximately one quarter of the U.S. electric power sector’s 
carbon dioxide emissions.” Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power, 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 267–68 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 100. See David A. Grossman, Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate 
Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2003). Grossman argues that such causes of 
action might be “legally viable,” id. at 3, and that because of a “widely perceived lack of 
meaningful political action” in the area of global warming, litigation may be the “best tool for 
addressing climate change . . . .” Id. at 6; see also Eduardo M. Peñalver, Acts of God or Toxic 
Torts? Applying Tort Principles to the Problem of Climate Change, 38 NAT. RESOURCES J. 563 
(1998). 
 101. See Elizabeth E. Hancock, Note, Red Dawn, Blue Thunder, Purple Rain: Corporate 
Risk of Liability for Global Climate Change and the SEC Disclosure Dilemma, 17 GEO. INT’L 
ENVTL. L. REV. 233, 244 (2005) (arguing that the tort framework is unworkable in the global 
warming context, because “while the global warming impact mechanism is arguably certain, an 
individual greenhouse gas-producer’s liability for global climate change is generally non-
quantifiable and may be largely dependent on external factors outside the producer’s control”). 
 102. Rather than decide the case on standing grounds, the district court judge dismissed the 
action solely through appeal to the political question doctrine, noting that a court must decide 
“whether the duty asserted can be judicially identified and its breach judicially determined, and 
whether protection for the right asserted can be judicially molded.” Am. Elec. Power, 406 F. 
Supp. 2d at 271 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962)). 
 103. Id. at 274. Specifically, the court sided with the defendants’ arguments that certain 
initial policy determinations were necessary, such as a decision whether “the societal costs of 
reducing [greenhouse gas] emissions [should] be borne by just a segment of the electricity-
generating industry . . . .” Id. at 273. 
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theory, if the science behind global warming was more complete,104 
litigation might be more viable. In the context of global ozone 
depletion, the case of Covington v. Jefferson County105 serves to 
illustrate this point. 
In Covington, the Ninth Circuit found that plaintiffs had 
adequately demonstrated standing to sue defendants who had 
unlawfully maintained a landfill across the street from the plaintiffs’ 
home.106 Though the majority of the court resolved the standing issue 
on traditional grounds,107 Judge Gould, writing a concurring opinion, 
endorsed a theory of standing based solely on the global harm of 
ozone depletion, caused by the emission of chlorofluorocarbons at the 
landfill.108 Citing a number of Supreme Court cases, Judge Gould 
wrote that the specific and particularized injury of ozone depletion 
could serve to satisfy the injury in fact requirement, even though the 
injury is “general” in the sense that ozone depletion is a global 
problem affecting everyone.109 
Though the concurrence in Covington is significant in that it lays 
at least some foundation for standing to litigate global issues, 
environmentalists are still faced with the problem of litigating a very 
uncertain body of law in the context of a very rigid and narrowly 
construed standing doctrine. Consequently, courts have found it 
 
 104. Considerable debate exists as to the completeness and reliability of global climate 
change claims. For a comprehensive overview of the current state of global climate change 
science, see INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: 
WORKING GROUP II: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY (James McCarthy et al. eds., 
2001). For a critical account of current global climate change science, see ROBERT C. BALLING, 
JR., THE HEATED DEBATE: GREENHOUSE PREDICTIONS VS. CLIMATE REALITY (1992). 
 105. 358 F.3d 626 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 106. Id. at 638. 
 107. Id. The court found that the Covingtons alleged adequate injury by claiming that the 
hazardous landfill created a risk of fires, explosions, scavengers, and groundwater 
contamination, thereby threatening the Covingtons’ enjoyment of life and security of home. Id.  
 108. Id. at 649–55 (Gould, J., concurring). 
 109. Id. at 651. Gould chose to reserve judgment on this issue and present his reasoning in 
a concurrence simply because the issue of ozone depletion was not one that the parties had 
briefed and was not essential to deciding the case. Id. at 649 n.1. Gould’s theory for standing 
placed heavy emphasis on the clarity and conclusive nature of the scientific evidence in support 
of ozone depletion. Id. at 649–50. Additionally, Gould paid special attention to the 
particularized harm of ozone depletion, and argued that the “concrete actual injury, even 
though shared by others generally is sufficient to provide injury in fact.” Id. at 651 (citing FEC 
v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998)); see also United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory 
Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973). 
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easiest, where possible, to resolve standing issues by avoiding the 
global inquiry entirely.110 
While the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of 
environmental suit standing since Laidlaw, that decision was at least 
an indication that the Court is willing to recognize environmental 
injury as having many forms.111 In trying to apply Laidlaw reasoning, 
the circuit courts—such as the D.C. Circuit in Massachusetts,112 and 
the Ninth Circuit in Ecological Rights Foundation v. Pacific Lumber 
Co.113—have discovered that some overlap between merits and 
standing issues is inevitable, and this is a problem the current 
standing doctrine is simply not capable of addressing. Thus, 
commentators have called for a different standing doctrine when 
litigating such global harms as global climate change.114 The extent 
to which such proposals will be successful remains to be seen. 
 
 110. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Abraham, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 
2002). The court found that the plaintiffs adequately established injury through their concerns 
regarding adverse health affects of smog and air pollution, however their concerns regarding 
global warming were “too general, too unsubstantiated, too unlikely to be caused by 
defendants’ conduct, and/or too unlikely to be redressed by the relief sought to confer 
standing.” Id. 
 111. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167 (2000); supra 
notes 77–87 and accompanying text. 
 112. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see supra notes 1–5, 7–9 and 
accompanying text. 
 113. 230 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2000). The court in Pacific Lumber noted that, under Laidlaw, 
“an individual can establish ‘injury in fact’ by showing a connection to the area of concern 
sufficient to make credible the contention that the person’s future life will be less enjoyable 
. . . .” Id. at 1149. The Ninth Circuit held that “requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate actual 
environmental harm in order to obtain standing would . . . compel the plaintiff to prove more to 
show standing than she would have to prove to succeed on the merits.” Id. at 1151. Moreover, 
the court said a “flexible approach” is the only approach that is consistent with recognition of 
aesthetic and recreational injury. Id. at 1150. 
 114. See Margaret B. Hinman & Alexandra Haas, The Constitutional Doctrine of Standing, 
as Applied to Citizens Seeking to Right ‘Global’ Wrongs, ADVOCATE, Aug. 2004, at 11 
(discussing, in the context of the Covington case, an analysis of injury in fact through 
qualitative as opposed to quantitative means); Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty as a Basis for 
Standing, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1123, 1124 (2005) (noting the possibility that, rather than 
establish standing on the basis of possible future harm, litigants could argue standing based on 
immediate environmental injury). 
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III. ANALYSIS 
That the standing doctrine is a constitutionally required mandate 
of sound jurisprudence cannot be disputed. Article III expressly limits 
judicial review to “cases and controversies,”115 and if this phrase is to 
mean anything, it must mean that a plaintiff or petitioner must meet 
minimum requirements in order to be properly before the court.116 
However, the content of those minimum requirements seems by no 
means explicitly clear from the text of Article III. As a result, courts 
have struggled to define what is meant by the idea of standing; first 
with the elusive requirement of a “defined legal interest,”117 and later 
with the “injury in fact” test,118 together with additional requirements 
of causation and redressability. Unfortunately, as the doctrine of 
injury in fact standing has grown, becoming more elaborate and more 
specific, it has become difficult to say where the constitutional 
mandate ends, and where mere judicial policy begins. 
In any event, it is clear that the modern approach to standing was 
not designed with an eye toward facilitating (and clarifying the outer 
bounds of) environmental litigation. The result has been a mixed, 
inconsistent, and confusing body of law, which offers little guidance 
from one case to the next as to how standing issues ought to best be 
resolved. 
Given the confusion and uncertainty surrounding the injury-in-fact 
test, it was perhaps not surprising that the circuit courts resorted to 
“hypothetical jurisdiction” to resolve easy cases which posed difficult 
standing problems.119 Judicial economy would seem to dictate that, 
 
 115. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 116. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514 (1868) (“Without jurisdiction the court 
cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases 
to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing 
the cause.”). Justice Scalia in Steel Co. noted that the Supreme Court’s “insistence that proper 
jurisdiction appear begins at least as early as 1804.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 
U.S. 83, 95 (1998) (citing Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 126 (1804)). 
 117. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 118. See supra notes 18–23 and accompanying text. 
 119. See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text. The rationale for use of hypothetical 
jurisdiction was two-fold. First, courts often justified hypothetical jurisdiction by claiming 
judicial economy considerations. Second, (and commentators have noted ironically) 
hypothetical jurisdiction was seen as fostering judicial restraint. See Scott C. Idleman, The 
Demise of Hypothetical Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 52 VAND. L. REV. 235, 247 (1999) 
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where a case could quickly be disposed of on the merits, the 
jurisdictional “bramble bush” created by the standing issue should 
best be avoided.120 But, as the holding in Steel Co. made clear, 
hypothetical jurisdiction, while convenient, did not solve the standing 
problem. Rather, it merely side-stepped the problem, leading to 
hypothetical judgments of highly questionable precedential value.121 
In light of this fact, the Supreme Court was right to expressly 
condemn the practice.  
Unfortunately, in the wake of Steel Co., a new problem in the field 
of environmental suits has surfaced: the frequent merger of standing 
issues with the merits of plaintiffs’ environmental claims has left 
courts ill-equipped to resolve the problems of a plaintiff’s standing in 
a consistent and reliable manner. When the bar for standing is set too 
high, the line between the three-part injury, causation, and redress 
analysis and the merits of a plaintiff’s case becomes 
indistinguishable. Plaintiffs are left in the unfortunate position of 
having to prove that they will win on the merits of their case just to 
show that they have standing to litigate their claim in the first place. 
The Massachusetts case provides a clear example of this very 
problem. Petitioners sought to compel the EPA to regulate carbon 
dioxide under the Clean Air Act after the Agency had already refused 
to do so.122 The petitioners’ case in chief rested on the theory that the 
failure to regulate carbon dioxide contributed to global warming, 
thereby causing the particularized harm of rising sea levels and 
increased flooding.123 According to the petitioners, forcing the 
 
(explaining both rationales). 
 120. See United States v. Parcel of Land, 928 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1991). 
 121. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 101; see also Idleman, supra note 119, at 259 (noting that 
hypothetical jurisdiction doctrine was fraught with difficulties, including unjustified over-use 
and inconsistent application). 
 122. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also supra notes 2–3 and 
accompanying text. 
 123. Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 53. According to the court: 
[P]etitioners filed two volumes of declarations with the court, some containing lengthy 
exhibits. The declarations, from scientists, engineers, state officials, homeowners, 
users of the nation’s recreational resources, and other individuals, predict catastrophic 
consequences from global warming caused by greenhouse gases, including loss of or 
damage to state and private property, frequent intense storm surge floods, and 
increased health care costs. 
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Agency to regulate carbon dioxide would reduce global warming and 
its harmful effects.124 But it was these very claims that the Agency 
attacked in contesting the petitioners’ standing. The injury-in-fact 
claim, along with causation and redressability, required proof of the 
very same issues. If the petitioners could not show at the outset that 
they would win on the merits, then they were precluded from meeting 
their burden to show standing. 
If the current standing doctrine poses a catch-22 for environmental 
plaintiffs, it poses an identical problem for judges who hear such 
cases. Judges cannot be expected to review the exact same set of facts 
and arguments, used twice to advocate for two different results at two 
stages in the litigation process. While the proof required at the trial 
itself is ultimately judged by a clear “preponderance of the evidence” 
standard, it is not at all clear what standard applies to proof of 
standing, particularly when the evidentiary burden may shift 
depending on when the opposing party chooses to contest that 
standing.125 With respect to the Massachusetts case, one commentator 
noted that the D.C. Circuit Court was completely handicapped by the 
standing doctrine from the very outset: The court could not 
pronounce that the petitioners had standing without effectively 
overruling the EPA’s administrative ruling, and yet could not review 
that administrative ruling without first finding that the petitioners had 
standing.126 
Ultimately, the majority in Massachusetts was left with two 
options: deny standing outright and refuse to consider the matter 
further, or assume arguendo that the petitioners had standing and 
proceed to the merits. The majority chose the latter, and in so doing, 
expressly violated the procedural mandate set forth in Steel Co.127 
Regardless of whether such an approach led ultimately to an invalid 
 
Id. at 54 (citation omitted). 
 124. Id. at 54–55. 
 125. See supra notes 31–37 and accompanying text. 
 126. Farber, supra note 114, at 1128. 
 127. Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 55–56. Judge Randolph, writing for the majority, noted 
that Steel Co. actually allows for the course of action chosen by the court when dealing with 
questions of statutory standing. Id. at 56. Judge Randolph offered little in the way of 
justification as to why the approach was permissible in addressing issues of constitutional 
standing. Id. 
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and unworkable hypothetical judgment, the merger of merits and 
standing left the court with no other reasonable choice. 
The Massachusetts case thus clearly demonstrates that a new 
approach to standing is needed for litigation involving global 
environmental issues. Litigants who have tried to squeeze the square 
peg of global climate change injury through the round hole of current 
standing doctrine have met with mixed results, and those taking novel 
approaches such as mass tort, nuisance claims, and class action suits 
have thus far fared no better.128  
The federal courts have not seen the last of cases alleging injury 
based on global climate change. In practical terms, however, concrete 
and uncontested injury will rarely if ever be provable in such cases. 
Though the Supreme Court recognized as much in Laidlaw, that case 
has not been interpreted by the circuit courts with any definite 
consistency,129 and the future of global environmental issue standing 
is anything but certain. 
IV. PROPOSAL 
Though a judicial solution to the problem of standing in global 
environmental issue suits may be elusive, certain practical resolutions 
to the problem can be articulated. The mere evolution of the science 
behind global climate change may offer a solution to the standing 
problem. If, in the future, environmental science is more able to 
accurately predict climate change and its effects—and to link climate 
change with carbon dioxide production—injury will consequently be 
easier to establish.130 Such a change in the science would more 
closely align the campaign against global warming more with that 
 
 128. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power, 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(discussed supra notes 96–103 and accompanying text). 
 129. See Melanie A. Anbarci, The Laidlaw Decision: Shield or Sword?, 7 HASTINGS W.-
NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 143, 150–53 (2001) (discussing possible implications of Laidlaw); 
Hans Hull, Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals Grants Standing to Citizen Group, 28 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 555 (2001) (discussing the inconsistent application of Laidlaw by the circuit courts). 
 130. While scientific knowledge of the global warming phenomenon is continually 
increasing, recent studies have proposed novel theories as to the precise link between carbon 
dioxide, global warming, and global environmental harm. See Julian A. Dowdeswell, The 
Greenland Ice Sheet and Global Sea-Level Rise, 311 SCIENCE 963 (2006); Damon Matthews, 
Global Change: The Water Cycle Freshens Up, 439 NATURE 793 (2006). 
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against ozone depletion—a phenomenon that has a much more 
established scientific record, and a cause to which courts have 
generally been much more amenable. 
Additionally, the problem of global climate change standing could 
be avoided entirely if global warming were addressed through 
legislative (as opposed to adjudicative) measures. Court opinions 
dismissing actions based on global climate change have said as 
much;131 however, in the current political climate, indications that 
such legislation might materialize (let alone succeed) are slight. 
Thus, there is still a clear need for a judicial solution to the 
problem presented by global environmental issue litigation generally, 
and climate change litigation in particular. One such solution was, 
ironically enough, presented and then rejected by the court in the 
Massachusetts case. The plurality opinion indicated the possibility of 
referring the matter of the petitioners’ standing to a special master for 
review.132 Though the court ultimately concluded that such a move 
would be “folly,”133 it would arguably be no less so than proceeding 
on the merits without first resolving the standing problem. 
Use of a special master would avoid the problem of the same 
court reviewing the same evidence for two different purposes. It 
would establish a clear, independent assessment of petitioners’ 
standing, and could conceivably have the effect of clarifying just 
what is required for a party to establish standing. In short, use of a 
special master would take the normative distinction between standing 
and merits and transform it into a procedural mandate, rather than 
leaving it an abstract, theoretical exercise. 
An important consideration to keep in mind, however, is that such 
a procedure would only be appropriate in those rare cases in which 
Article III standing and merits have merged. This is entirely distinct 
from the earlier hypothetical jurisdiction practice, which was applied 
by federal courts merely on the basis that the standing issue presented 
was “difficult” for the judiciary.134 
 
 131. See Am. Elec. Power, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 272–73 (discussed supra notes 96–103 and 
accompanying text). 
 132. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 133. Id. (quoting WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 28, § 3531.15). 
 134. See Smith v. Avino, 91 F.3d 105, 108 (11th Cir. 1996). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol23/iss1/7
p175 Cooney book pages.doc  4/12/2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2007]  Article III Standing in Environmental Cases 201 
 
 
The second solution, which could potentially provide the clearest 
resolution and have the greatest impact, would be for the Supreme 
Court to address the standing issue in depth when it issues an opinion 
in the Massachusetts case. The Court’s holding in Steel Co. did not 
adequately resolve the problem of what to do when merits and Article 
III standing issues merged. Justice Scalia noted that the overlap 
between merits and Article III standing would only happen with 
regard to “entirely frivolous” claims.135 However, as the 
Massachusetts case has now clearly demonstrated, such is not the 
case. Merits and standing can and, in fact, do overlap in cases like 
Massachusetts, which involve a globalized harm that is both concrete 
and particularized.  
The Court has, for some time now, recognized that a cause of 
action based on injury suffered by the public at large is not per se 
barred by the standing doctrine, so long as that injury is itself 
sufficiently definite. This recognition repudiates the long-held maxim 
that “injury to all is injury to no one.”136 This fact, along with 
Laidlaw’s expanded conception of what may constitute 
environmental injury, would seem to indicate that global 
environmental harm litigation may be viable.  
But the current standing doctrine does not allow for such wrongs 
to be litigated in a way that ensures any consistency or predictability. 
The fusion of standing and merits in such cases presents litigants with 
an impossible hurdle at the very outset: the contest over whether the 
complaining party has standing masks the primary issue to be 
litigated and leaves courts in a jurisdictional quagmire—courts are 
forced to judge a party’s standing with a rigid three-part injury in fact 
doctrine that is ill-equipped to handle the task.  
A separate and distinct rubric by which to judge a party’s standing 
in merger cases would solve this problem. The Court could 
pronounce either a unique judicial standard which might take into 
account the merger issue or a separate procedural rule which could 
accommodate the overlap of standing and merits. Perhaps the easiest 
 
 135. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 97 n.2 (1998). 
 136. See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23 (1998) (holding that, in order to bar standing for a 
“generalized grievance,” the harm must not only be widely shared, but must also be of “an 
abstract and indefinite nature”). 
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solution would be to treat such cases exactly as they come—resolving 
both standing and merits simultaneously, such that a party’s ability to 
establish standing would necessarily imply victory on the merits, and 
vice versa. Ultimately, it is a problem to which the Supreme Court 
itself must speak. In this particular area of law, the circuit courts can 
only apply past precedent, which is ill-fitted to the problem at hand, 
and can only result in judgments which are highly questionable. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Global climate change is undeniably a problem. Though the outer 
boundaries of our scientific understanding of the problem are 
uncertain, what is certain is the legal injury that global climate 
change has the potential to inflict. That being the case, litigation that 
centers around this controversy is not likely to abate. Legislative 
attempts to address the issue have stalled and do not appear to offer 
any real indication that the controversy will be resolved through the 
political process. Hence, litigation is becoming an evermore attractive 
option to environmentalists concerned about global climate change. 
The standing doctrine is an important tool which assures that 
parties are properly before a given court and are litigating a 
controversy that is both real and justiciable. Recent Supreme Court 
precedent has hinted that the injury of global warming (and legitimate 
concerns about global warming) may in fact be sufficiently concrete 
and particularized in order to establish standing for such cases. 
However, the nature of the injury is such that the standing issue 
becomes indistinguishable from the merits of the case. The current 
standing doctrine is not equipped to handle such an overlap, and the 
result has been a confusing and inconsistent line of global warming 
cases. The Massachusetts case in particular demonstrates the need for 
clear guidance on how to resolve cases of overlap between merits and 
Article III standing. By granting certiorari in the Massachusetts case, 
the Supreme Court is now the legal body best situated to provide such 
guidance, and it is imperative that it do so, lest the injury surrounding 
the threat of global warming be ignored. 
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